and whose responsibilities, by the Act of 1722, required that he and others so situated be, Faithful in the discharge of their. . . offices, tender and circumspect in their walk, punctual in their attendance upon ordinances, strict in their observation of the Lord's day, and regular in keeping up the worship of God in their families. 7 As ruling elder he participated regularly in the General Assembly, representing a variety of parishes or presbyteries, including, in spring 1762, the Presbytery of Cairston (Orkney), later North Isles, Currie, and for at least eleven years, Dunkeld, along with participation in various synods and assemblies continuing into the 1790s (Fagg n.d.) . 8 Even if he were not a practicing clergyman, it would be difficult to believe his participation in governing bodies of the Kirk of Scotland could be sustained without some assent to basic doctrines of Christianity. 9 To do so without such assent would require in Ferguson's outlook a cognitive dissonance that we have no reason to assume. Nonetheless, Lisa Hill points out that 'at no point does [Ferguson] describe himself as a Christian' (Hill 2006: 45, note 245) . 10 Perhaps he would not so describe himself because he had no need to do so. No one would have thought Ferguson anything other than a believing member of the Kirk, and his education and training would have betrayed nothing else. 11 Just the same, in a letter written in 1745, from Antwerp, while Deputy Chaplain, Ferguson recounts visiting many churches including Notre Dame Church with its installation of a Rubens painting that depicts, as Ferguson puts it, 'Our saviour taking down from the cross' (Correspondence, I, Letter 1: 5). 12 That Ferguson did not wish to be a clergyman tells us little about his valuation of either the calling itself or the church more generally, even less as to whether he had relinquished beliefs inculcated as a child. Given his friendships with other moderate clergy, as well as his views on the possibility of individual and social progress, there is no reason, on the other hand, to regard him as an orthodox Calvinist, even though in 1774 he would write from Geneva to David Hume, alerting him that, 'I am now writing on the Very Spot where Calvin reformed the reformed Churches this being the place of his house & Garden where we Live & I feel the warmth of my Zeal sufficiently against all reprobates although I shall not indulge it in this letter' (Correspondence, I, Letter 70: 112). 13 In his letters, as well as manuscript essays composed late in life, we find few explicit references to religious belief or to scripture.
14 If his letters are evidence, then it appears that as Ferguson grew older his religious sensibility either grew more acute or came more easily to expression. In correspondence written late in life (after age 74), we find Christian references, as well as allusions to an afterlife and to the reassuring presence of God. For example, in a letter of 1796 to Alexander Carlyle, after composing strong words against the French Revolution, (Ferguson) is 'fully persuaded we shall meet thereafter And know one Another'. To assuage any anxiety, he adds that 'you never can for Moment be separated from him [God] ' (Correspondence, II, Letter 301: 375) .
It is difficult to wrangle an unqualified judgment from this assemblage. However, John Brewer draws from Ferguson's life and letters to conclude that he 'remained a devoutly religious person' (Brewer 2008: 17) ; that the religious references seem occasional need not detract from Brewer's sympathetic assessment. To strengthen it, one might add that Ferguson labored on his own epitaph -though the final inscription was written by Sir Walter Scott -with each of four drafts including a line that testifies to having seen the 'works of God' (Correspondence, II, appendix O, . It should not be surprising that Ferguson may have held to a faith that, in general, he excluded from his public works. A scholar attempting to enter into a general (albeit European) conversation about the nature of humanity and society might not set forth his thoughts in relation to explicit doctrines of faith.
15 And yet all of Ferguson's works make a clear place for the Principles) appears commonplace at the time. The science of God focuses on three topics: the existence, properties, and governance of God. Ferguson maintains that there is universal belief in the existence of a Creator. However, he also purports to offer rational arguments for the existence of God, including a rudimentary argument from design, to which he appends the claim that we have a natural tendency to perceive purposeful order and to infer, thereby, an ordering being (Institutes, p. 124). God's design or providence has implications, as we shall see, for the human being, but it is clear that Ferguson embraces unexceptional propositions of natural theology regarding God and God's attributes. Moreover, Ferguson tends to uphold these as rational truths, apprehensible through natural reason.
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The other subject of pneumatics is the soul of the human being whose existence is known by self-consciousness (Institutes, p. 49). Within the soul, or intellectual nature -as distinct from matter, which is 'divisible and inert' (Institutes, p. 119) -one discerns a natural propensity to activity. This proclivity is important to Ferguson's overall outlook, with its emphases on action, improvement, and social development. Because of God's providence -a subject well-canvassed by scholars (Hill 2006; Chen 2008 ) -the human being is set within a world fit for material as well as moral and intellectual progress. As the Scot puts it, 'The best mariners are formed in boisterous seas' (Principles, I, p. 177). The significance of activity, or robust exertion (vigour), is a point to which we shall return.
For now, it is important to note that even in the case of immortality, there is an argument that turns on progressive activity. Distinguished by their starting points, the three arguments for immortality pivot from (a) the nature of soul, (b) 'the state of the fact at death' (Institutes, p. 119), or (c) principles of religion. Immortality could, in Ferguson's view, be established from the nature of the soul (a) through a consideration of its indivisibility and the divisibility of matter, an argument not unique to Ferguson (and clearly compatible with scriptural distinctions, as in Romans chapter 8, between the way of flesh and the way of spirit). Since the soul is indivisible and since parts can be dispersed, then the soul contains nothing to disperse and therefore nothing to annihilate. So it follows, Ferguson maintains, that the soul is 'physically immortal' (Institutes, p. 120). The argument from the fact of death (b) would show only that life exits the body, not that the soul ceases to exist. Ferguson first sets aside any argument from principles of religion (c), returning to it once he has adumbrated God's attributes (unity, power, wisdom, goodness and justice), all of which are apprehensible by reason. Given these properties, God would preserve intelligent creatures, especially since there is always room for additional minds that, unlike animal bodies, do not take up space. Moreover, a desire for immortality is instinctive 'and is a reasonable intimation of what is intended by the author of this desire' (Institutes, p. 136). Notably, Ferguson then adds two points related to the moral progress of the human being: our progressive development may continue beyond the mortal realm; and the desire for justice remains unfulfilled in this life. These claims for immortality are presented as vaguely rational rather than as principles of a particular religious outlook.
Ferguson presents his examinations of God and the soul as accessible to a natural reason. Turning from principles of a natural theology to doctrines particular to Christianity, it becomes difficult to find evidence in the public works of substantive Christian theses. However, any such lack does not mean that these doctrines have no place in Ferguson's thought, nor does it imply that Ferguson did not espouse these beliefs.
The Christian doctrine of sin is worth considering not only because of its relevance to the Calvinist tradition in which he was reared but also because it relates to the twin ideas of activity and vigour. For many interpreters it is not so obvious that these sorts of propositions -those, for example, that declare a doctrine of sin, or set forth a pathway to salvation -even figure in Ferguson's personal belief system, much less in his writings. For example, Lisa Hill exclaims, 'But his repudiation of Scriptural authority, rejection of the Calvinist doctrine that salvation depends on the grace of God, denial of Special Providence and complete rejection of the concept of sin, original or otherwise, distances him from Christianity considerably' (Hill 2006: 50) . A few pages earlier, Hill writes, 'Everything exists for a reason; nothing in the universe is truly evil for all of the creation performs some positive role in the benign master plan' (p. 48). In the subsequent paragraph she quotes from Ferguson's Institutes, to assert ' "Complaints of moral evil" in people, are likewise really "the symptoms of a progressive or improving nature" ' (p. 48). However, Hill does not make clear where or how Ferguson 'repudiat[es] ' the authority of scripture. Moreover, her account may overstate the case that Ferguson rejects the concept of sin. His works do not offer a theory of sin but that omission does not entail a rejection of the concept. Nor would it entail that Ferguson's published work does not, in some sense, take sin into account.
In her argument, Hill quotes from a section of Ferguson's Institutes 'The Goodness of God'. There Ferguson indicates that human nature is 'fitted to a mixed scene' and that any complaints of physical evil refer not to absolute evil but serve, instead, as 'excitements to exert its [active] power' (Institutes, p. 131). Unless there were evil -'apparent evils to be corrected' -then there would be no point to activity, but happiness depends on active exertion, not on 'the measure of conveniency ' (p. 131) . Nonetheless, what about moral evil? Here Ferguson drops any reference to appearances and refers to real evil: 'A being that perceives no moral evil, or no defect, could have no principle of improvement' (p. 132). The 'complaints of moral evil' he maintains can be vanquished only by ridding humanity of imperfection or making persons 'insensible of the imperfections they have' (p. 132).
There is, admittedly, something antiseptic in these formulations. However, in the Principles Ferguson introduces moral evil with a vocabulary hewing more closely to notions of sinfulness. In fact, section XVI, entitled 'Of the Origin of Evil', is one of only three sections or chapters in the two volumes of the Principles that begins with an epigraph, in this case five lines from the opening of Milton's Paradise Lost. 17 In providing this epigraph, Ferguson signals that he is responding to the problem of sin and disobedience to God, even if the response is secular rather than theological. As Ferguson proceeds he considers, first, how the human being, at the pinnacle of the system of nature, must make effort to progress and 'is every where surrounded with occasions that require its [the] exertion' of intellect (Principles, I, 176) . So there are physical evils that the human being confronts but these, Ferguson suggests, are appropriate to his nature. In fact, without physical evils (or the evils committed by individuals) there would be no place for moral improvement. 18 Turning from physical to moral evil, Ferguson attests, 'But the depravity of his [man's] own nature, and the frequency of his crimes, are evils more real, and less reconcilable to the conception of a just and beneficent author' (Principles, I, p. 180). The result of free will, such depravity is explained by Ferguson through a vocabulary of 'error' and 'mistake'. These would seem to be the terms of a secular (or Enlightened) account, but the secular and muted tenor also reflects Occam's razor. In fact, Ferguson suggests that there may be alternative explanations, perhaps religious or scriptural: 'Has not malice . . . a deeper root in human nature than mere error or mistake? It may have such a root; but if effort and mistake be sufficient to account, for the germ of this poisonous plant, we have no occasion to look for any root that is deeper. It is a maxim in reason, not to assume more causes than are existent in nature, and sufficient to explain the phenomena' (Principles, I, p. 181). He then argues that error and mistake may 'lead to competition and strife, to injury and suffering' and these result from a belief that the success of one means loss to the other (p. 181). However, Ferguson then proceeds to point out a 'peculiarly dangerous' error into which individuals may succumb: the 'mistake of precedence ' (p, 182) , the tendency to think only in comparative terms ('in respect to rank, power, or wealth', p. 182) rather than in terms of what is, by its nature, good or evil. How can the competition for precedence be forestalled? By understanding that genuine good is compatible with benefit to all rather than some.
Ferguson's appeal to 'precedence' appears as a secular version of Biblical pride. However, the solution to such pride is knowledge that genuine good entails goodness for all (that the success of one does not harm others). Although his language is less than perspicuous, Ferguson is not asserting that knowledge is sufficient to overcome evil, only that it is necessary: if we can attain knowledge of the good, then the present state may give way to a better one 'in which malice, in the progress of information, will be corrected; and every other evil disposition or habit, resulting from his ignorance or false apprehension will be suppressed' (Principles, I, p. 182). However, the moral correction may also require a 'reform' of 'dispositions and actions ' (p. 183) .
In this account, Ferguson is not denying some notion of original sin even as his explanation of wrongdoing presents a secular approach. Nonetheless, the more general appeal to improvement hardly seems indicative of a Presbyterian mindset, steeped in Calvin's Institutes. 19 In this sense, Ferguson's faith proves unorthodox even if genuine. And thus does his work as a whole form a moment within an 'Enlightened' world, at least if one takes Enlightenment to involve an appeal to a form of reason independent of the particular propositions of a faith (see Broadie 2001:113) . That said, Ferguson's perspective on action and vigour may draw inspiration from his experience with the Scottish Kirk and more interestingly from a basic tenet of Biblical belief. To broach these topics, we must first consider the defense of energetic action.
action and vigour
Throughout his works Ferguson prioritizes the significance of action and robust endeavor (Oz-Salzberger 2008; Smith 2008 ). However, the appeal to activity may seem trivial and uninteresting: after all, since the human being is an agent, one would expect nothing less than activity! The interest and significance of Ferguson's appeal rests in the way he suggests that the crucial feature of activity is, effectively, its character as moral, robust, and energetic. In his Essay, he utilizes a vocabulary of 'vigour' to demarcate this constellation of ideas; this term also features in several of his manuscript essays. 20 We shall revert to this term often, but it should be recognized that this expression scarcely appears in his Principles, even though the general notion of robust moral engagement is not altogether absent from that work. The idea of vigour, as well as the less specific notion of energetic moral endeavor, serves as both a salient and original element of Ferguson's thought. Given the importance of the general idea, it is intriguing that in several instances, in both Principles and Manuscripts, Ferguson seems to suggest that something like vigorous activity displays how the human being could be said to reflect the Divine. To consider this more fully, it is necessary to recount the metaphysical foundation of activity, connect activity to morality, and then delineate how robust activity crystallizes, in the Essay, as vigour.
All animals engage in activity but human beings possess a mind capable of self-consciousness, will, and intelligence, with the latter understood to include affective states (Principles I, pp. 64-67). 21 Borrowing from Hobbes (and in terms equally redolent of Thomas Reid), Ferguson summarizes the capacities of mind in terms of cognitive powers (knowledge and its related operations) and active powers of choice and action (Principles I, p. 68). Unlike a being that lacks a principle of motion or change 'in its own nature' (Principles, I, p. 190), the human is the highest sort of progressive being and possesses the capacity to initiate change. What distinguishes the human as a progressive being is its intelligence and will (Principles, I, p. 190) . In this way the progress of the human being consists in movement or change for something better -this is the principle of 'ambition'. 22 The human seeks and strives for improvement: 'The very life of man is Action And Languor not to be endured' (Manuscripts, p. 276). In this way, the human being is placed into circumstances that demand action.
Activity is essential to happiness: 'Labour is to man a source of enjoyment, and to the faculties with which he is furnished a principal means of improvement' and we are forever 'surrounded with occasions that require its [intelligent power] exertion' (Principles, I, pp. 175, 176). However, happiness is identical with moral merit in that each designates the same state or character of the person. Moral qualities or virtues (such as temperance, justice, wisdom and benevolence) are good in themselves and through their effects -even as the consequential benefits are less a matter of the agent's concern than a manifestation of Providence. Whereas David Hume suggested that our moral qualities are either 'agreeable or useful' to 'self or to others' (Treatise, III.II, p. 601), Ferguson does not adopt any such structure, dismissing any notion of happiness as allied with pleasure or pain. Without obstacles or evils, whether physical or moral, one could not make sense of the human being as an active being capable of moral improvement (Principles, I, p. 175). In fact, in the Essay, Ferguson remarks as to how, 'the most respectable attributes of his nature, magnanimity, fortitude, and wisdom, carry a manifest reference to the difficulties with which he is destined to struggle' (Essay, 48).
Even in his earlier work, the Institutes, Ferguson states that happiness depends 'on the degree of ardour and affection he exerts' (Institutes, pp. 131-2). As this statement suggests, it is important to recognize how easily Ferguson slides from a discussion of activity to a consideration of a kind, degree, or intensity of action. Although any action requires exertion, Ferguson's appeal to the necessity of struggle and labour pushes him, in the Essay, to rely on the distinct notion of 'vigour' to communicate the necessity of avid, fervent, and energetic action. (Sometimes Ferguson does not employ the term itself, referring only to exertion or struggle, but in these cases it is hard to resist the conclusion that he is assuming the same notion as that expressed by 'vigour'.)
Ferguson suggests that this energy of spirit may be found in rude societies or in civilized and 'be turned to a variety of purposes' so that it 'renders disorder itself respectable' (Essay, pp. 107,105). However, some of his language suggests that genuine vigour attaches to proper ends. One way of considering Ferguson's account of vigour is that it is a disposition oriented to certain kinds of ends, including in the broadest sense the ends of self-and societal preservation. In this sense the savage may prove vigorous even if his ends are not those that we might endorse. But a developed vigour attaches itself to good character and devotes itself to a good society. In Ferguson's estimate both private and public moral character rest on vigour (Essay, 189). It is necessary, therefore, to grasp the functional roles of vigour (moral and political) and to sketch its conceptual contours.
What is the function of vigour? Ferguson regards vigour as having both a moral and political function. In the public realm, vigour is required in order to preserve freedom, property, and 'the rights of the mind' (Essay, p. 161; see also p. 200 and p. 212). However, vigour is distinct from public spirit. In fact, Ferguson's moral (and political) outlook rests on complementary ideas, the idea of a public orientation (public spirit) and that of individual vigour. 23 Ferguson refers to various motivations that help secure liberty, including 'liberal sentiments', a desire for the 'preservation of public manners' and the necessity of 'attention or effort ' (Essay, p. 212) . Further on the same page he suggests that the greatest danger to liberty is a lack of vigour. Similarly, when he states that a national spirit requires 'vigorous, public-spirited, and resolute men' (p. 213), he is not waxing redundant but suggesting the importance of at least two distinct qualities or dispositions, that of vigour and that of public spirit. Thus it is that Ferguson wants those in the governing ranks to have the 'talents for the council and the field' (p. 215).
In the case of private action, an individual without vigour is prone to seek ease, pleasure, and frivolous pursuits, all of which will prove inimical, over time, to the sort of challenges and 'oppositions' required for moral improvement (Essay, p. 170; see also pp. 232, 245-6) . In this sense, Ferguson not only regards vigour as one measure of all activity, but essential to the moral life. 24 This does not entail that each and every moral act must be a vigorous one, only that in general and for the most part, one's moral actions should manifest vigour. A quality of action, vigour is neither virtue nor passion, even if it is a disposition that should be used morally. 25 Thus, Ferguson admits that 'personal spirit and vigour' allow individuals to distinguish their character (Essay, p. 188). The relevance of vigour to moral character is easy to see if we imagine its deficit. As an intuitive illustration, one may imagine those good and decent individuals who nonetheless lack, what one might call, moral backbone -vigour! It is not so much that such persons manifest weakness of will (failing to do what they know that they ought to do) than that they are irresolute and hesitant. Such persons shy from discerning or deducing an ethical consequence (whether it be intellectual or behavioral), and they have no eagerness to act alone, and are often unwilling to act at all unless they have achieved mental certainty on an issue or problem.
An attribute of mind, and not simply restless physical energy, vigour is an essential condition of political freedom and moral character. But what is it? In the earliest stages of society, an exertion of vigour suggests that 'every consideration, but that of his object, is forgotten' (Essay, p. 23) . In this primitive state of society, vigour, as a form of energy and verve, is not constrained within moral ends. Once constrained, vigour may suggest a resolute focus and determination rather than a blind and single-minded pursuit. The person of vigour is not easily dissuaded. In this sense, vigour conveys strength, as when one 'overawe[s]' or 'resist[s] with fortitude' (Essay, p. 28). It is perhaps for this reason that vigour develops by 'contending with difficulties', not by relaxing (Essay, p. 242). But vigour is not simply physical strength but steadfastness. For example, Ferguson wisely points out that if a law, or set of laws, is to secure liberty, then vigour is required: 'without vigour to maintain what is acknowledged as a right, the mere record, or the feeble intention, is of little avail' (Essay, p. 160). It is not simply that law must be enforced, requiring a coercive power, but that there must be a willing energy to do so and to act on the understanding of what the law is intended to do. 26 There lies within Ferguson's steady appeal to vigour a subtle undercurrent: vigour relates to integrity. This relation can be glimpsed more clearly if one thinks of integrity not in terms of honesty but in terms of wholeness. 27 A vigorous person has ideals and acts to secure them and to hold to them steadfastly but with energy. Someone else may have ideals and yet be indifferent, a tendency which Ferguson takes to be in opposition to vigour. Such insouciance often leads to the sort of easygoing dispassion by which one comes to 'relax the nerves on which the force of a private and public character depends' (Essay, p. 189). Insofar as vigour relates to integrity, then so does true vigour relate to morality and serve as a quality of moral action. To be vigorous is not simply to be moral but to be steadfast, strong, and resolute; to be other than vigorous is to be changeable, weak, and hesitant. In this way, integrity becomes a matter not simply of conviction but of resolute practice.
civic humanism, vigour, and religion
What is there in Ferguson's appeals to exertion and to vigour that might relate to religion? Much of recent scholarship has adumbrated a civic humanist interpretation of Ferguson's work, and it is tempting to assimilate active exertion and vigour into this analysis. Any such interpretation relies typically on the illuminations of J.G.A. Pocock who construes Ferguson as a Scottish Machiavellian who utilizes a notion of virtú to express both social solidarity and primitive energy (1975: 501). Pocock's view is often restated. For example, Fania Oz-Salzberger contends that Ferguson's 'message' was that 'Citizens' virtue and political activism' were essential to a strong society (1995: 111). According to Oz-Salzberger, civic virtue was, essentially, 'willful action for the public good ' (195: 113) . No doubt the humanist interpretation recognizes the obvious relevance of Ferguson's appeal to energetic activity. As a last example, Oz-Salzberger concludes, in a more recent study, that Ferguson offers, in the Essay, a 'derivation of man's political person from his natural restlessness ' (2008: 153) . It is not my concern to debate directly the civic humanist interpretation, which is not without some justification. Nonetheless, the humanist interpretation focuses on language rather than on intentions or conceptualizations: it is not obvious that Ferguson employs a discourse of virtue with civic humanist ideals in mind. It is not, therefore, a foregone conclusion that Ferguson embraces any civic humanist notion that 'the human personality. . . [i]s fully expressed only in the practice of citizenship' (Pocock 1983: 235) .
Are there other sources for Ferguson's appeal to vigour? 28 It is not implausible to consider how a practical influence on Ferguson may have sustained his interest in vigour and robust action. The influence in question would have been his identification and engagement with Presbyterian moderates. As Thomas Ahnert has pointed out, 'Moderates stressed the importance of conduct rather than doctrinal truth for religion ' (2011: 81) . A full participant in the moderate faction of Scottish Presbyterianism, Ferguson would have assented to the emphasis on deeds, conduct within society, rather than on propositional or doctrinal debates.
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Perhaps therefore, the appeal of vigour had foundation not only in Ferguson's metaphysics and morals but also in his experiences within the Church of Scotland. For the Church was now moving to act within society rather than remain apart, and its members would also need to act within the Kirk, as Ferguson regularly did as an elder (Clark 1970: 207) . The moderates had their own experiences of standing firm and contesting their opponents if they were to achieve success (whether on the question of ministerial patronage, or on issues in the wider society, such as the debate over a Scots Militia). There also was a deeper question of doctrine and the freedom to believe. Vigour was essential to a freedom that could easily be abrogated through the sovereign's enforcement of doctrinal or theological belief. Perhaps with the memory of the execution of Thomas Aikenhead in mind, Ferguson attacks explicitly the very idea of prosecuting someone for atheism.
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In other instances, Ferguson writes against the misuse and misappropriation of religious belief:
It has become a proverbial expression, that the abuse of the best things becomes the worst; and this, no doubt, has been verified in the abuse of religion. Though in the proper use of it, the highest and most beneficial attainment of human nature, in the abuse, it has become the source of great evil; a bar to knowledge and freedom of thought; a source of rancour, malice, revenge, and cruelty, beyond any other principle of depravation incident to the mind of man. (Principles, I, p. 170; see also II, pp. 100, 320) That Ferguson may have felt influence from his own experience is speculative. However, apart from experience, Stoicism, or even civic humanism, there remains another source of possible inspiration for Ferguson's appeal to vigour, the first book of the Bible: 'And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . So God created man in his own image . . . . .
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In several instances Ferguson compares how robust activity, exertion and attainment -the very sorts of endeavor crystallized in the notion of vigour -might approach or resemble the Divine.
In the first volume of the Principles, Ferguson recounts how the atheist contends that human toil and trouble reveal that God either lacks wisdom and goodness or doesn't exist at all. To rebut the atheist, Ferguson suggests, one must conjure a scene 'in which every desire were at once gratified without delay, difficulty or trouble', but such a scene would mean that human activity would have no point. On the contrary, 'the good to be gained is not an exemption from labour, but the improvement of his intellectual faculties, and an approach to the resemblance of that being whose good is beneficence and wisdom . . . ' (Principles, I, see also, Manuscripts, p. 229) . In other words, such improvement requires exertion and struggle, energetic moral action -whose paradigm is vigour -so as to live in the image of God. ' (p. 79) . In this sense energetic but morally constrained activities, exemplified in vigorous action, constitute the happiest condition. In another essay, 'Of the Things that Are or May Be', Ferguson describes how intelligent nature (the human being) has been 'condemn[ed] to pass through the Scenes which are acted in this Moral Life'. In other words, Ferguson asks, why is it that the human being must encounter 'continual occasions of exertion' (Manuscripts, p. 183) and thus expend effort and labor and power to achieve moral merit?
32 His response unites the fact of human choice with the projects carried out by choice: one must elect and perform to completion one's activities in order to have merit and happiness. Ferguson then concludes: 'It is in this if in Any Respect we are entitled to say that man is formed after the Image of God and hence it is that he is placed with Propriety in the Garden of God. . . ' (Manuscripts, p. 230) . 33 It would seem that at the very heart of Ferguson's moral thought, in his appeal to energetic activity or vigour, there rests a basic appeal to the creation of man by God. Through robust or vigorous activity one constructs a life that reflects, however distantly, one's Maker. Ferguson's appropriation of the analogy from the book of Genesis need not entail that Ferguson had no Stoic influences on his thought, or that he felt no attraction to the vocabulary of civic humanism. However, Ferguson sets forth the analogy towards the last quarter of his life, at a time when he has a more synoptic sense of his own work. Perhaps he comes to appreciate how one of his most significant ideas expressed his own belief that the human being is made in God's image. Along with his Providentialism, his experience within the Kirk, and his associations with moderate literati, it is this conception of the human being that seems to inform Ferguson's perspective and to assist in framing his overall outlook. However, the works that he produced need not be considered as surreptitiously, or tacitly, religious, thus to be mined for previously unnoticed elements of faith. What emerges is simpler. In the overall frame of Ferguson's thinking lodges a Biblical belief that the human being was created in God's image and that each individual, therefore, has a special and significant place, as well as a signal if not sacred responsibility. ' Two alternatives were open to the Church in the middle of the eighteenth century. Either it could retreat into its shell, or it could frankly recognize its new relationship to society by seeking to establish its own independence and freedom of action while at the same time interpenetrating and when necessary criticizing society from within' (Clark 1970: 204-5 Graham (2008) . 31 John Calvin explains that it is in virtue of the soul that the human is created in God's image. However, with sin the human being is alienated from God and as a result the image of God is 'so corrupted, that any thing which remains is fearful deformity' (Calvin, Institutes, I.XV.4, p. 164 ). Ferguson has moved away from this Calvinist construal, but he nonetheless links the idea of activity and exertion to the human being as image of God. 32 At the close of his essay, 'Distinction of Value and its Source in Existence', Ferguson concludes, 'But here also Is God, And the Storms which in moments of Superficial thinking may incline us to Doubt Proclaim Him more loudly than does any provision that is made for Indulgence of Safety in the lower Forms of Life' (Manuscripts, p. 89). 33 Ferguson employs the phrase 'garden of God' in the Principles (I, p. 268) but there the expression refers explicitly to society: 'Society, in which alone the distinction of right and wrong is exemplified, may be considered as the garden of God, in which the tree of knowledge of good and evil is planted; and in which men are destined to distinguish, and to chuse, among its fruits'.
